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An Unveiling 
EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A BAN 
ON FACE COVERINGS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past two years, both France and Belgium have 
enacted complete bans on face veils in public, with the French 
law taking effect in April 2011.1 These “burqa bans,” as they 
are known, represent efforts to harmonize Western societal 
values with Muslim religious beliefs and practices. Within 
many European countries and much of the rest of the world, 
commentators continue to vigorously debate whether Muslim 
face veils have a place in public.2 Spain and Germany have both 
enacted partial bans.3 For example, Germany has banned the 
face veil in public schools,4 while Spain has banned the veil in 
public administration buildings.5 Italy, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands have also considered such restrictions.6 Most 
  
 1 See Jennie Ryan, Belgium Burqa Ban Takes Effect, JURIST (July 24, 2011, 
12:30 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/belgium-burqa-ban-takes-effect.php; see 
also John Paul Putney, France Burqa Ban to Take Effect April 11, JURIST (Mar. 4, 2011, 
4:20 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/03/france-burqa-ban-to-take-effect-april-11.php. 
 2 See, e.g., Christina Mahfouz & Grace Brown, The Burqa Debate: To Ban or 
Not to Ban, PERSPECTIVIST (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.perspectivist.com/politics/the-
burqa-debate-to-ban-or-not-to-ban; see also David Mitchell, If Britain Decides to Ban the 
Burqa I Might Just Start Wearing One, OBSERVER (July 24, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/25/david-mitchell-burqa-ban-tattoos. 
 3 France Hardly Alone on Burqa Ban, NEWSDESK (July 21, 2010), 
http://newsdesk.org/2010/07/france-hardly-alone-on-burqa-ban/ (Barcelona and several 
other towns in Spain have banned burqas in government buildings); Germany’s First 
Burka Ban Imposed by the State of Hesse, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12353626 (the German state of Hesse 
prohibits public sector employees from wearing a burqa).  
 4 Germany’s First Burka Ban, supra note 3. 
 5 France Hardly Alone on Burqa Ban, supra note 3. 
 6 See Italy Approves Draft Law to Ban Burqa, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2011, 9:54 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/03/italy-draft-law-burqa; see also Dutch 
to Ban Full-Face Veils, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, at A6; Dutch Plan Ban on Muslim 
Face Veils Next Year, Reuters (Jan. 27, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/01/27/us-dutch-burqa-ban-idUSTRE80Q1OT20120127 (former Dutch government 
planned a ban to go in effect in 2013, but the overturn of the government may see that 
legislation scrapped); English Schools Get Right to Ban Muslim Veils, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 
2007, 7:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/20/us-britain-schools-veil-
idUSL2071360120070320 [hereinafter English Schools Ban]. 
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recently, Canada declared that women are required to remove 
face-covering veils when taking the citizenship oath.7 Reactions 
on both sides of the debate have been impassioned. Those 
favoring the ban believe that the face veil limits women’s 
access to society, poses security threats, and robs women of 
their identity.8 They claim that the face veil is inconsistent with 
the values of Western society.9 Those against the ban believe it 
represents an attack on women’s freedom to choose how to 
dress and that it is intolerant of Muslim religious practices.10 
From the American perspective, the First Amendment’s 
protection of religious freedom provides an additional basis for 
objecting to the face veil, resulting in another set of varying 
opinions on whether Western society should allow the veil.11 
President Barack Obama addressed the growing European 
sentiment against face veils during a speech in Cairo on June 
4, 2009, stating that “[i]t is important for Western countries to 
avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practicing religion as 
they see fit—for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim 
woman should wear. We cannot disguise hostility towards any 
religion behind the pretense of liberalism.”12 Offering a different 
perspective, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in response to 
  
 7 Niqabs, Burkas Must be Removed During Citizenship Ceremonies: Jason Kenney, 
NAT’L POST (last updated Dec. 12, 2011, 5:32 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/12/ 
niqabs-burkas-must-be-removed-during-citizenship-ceremonies-jason-kenney/ (banning 
face veils during citizenship ceremonies to ensure that all citizenship candidates can be 
seen taking the oath as required by law, “not simply a practical measure . . . [but one] 
that goes to the heart of our identity and our values of openness and equality.”).  
 8 See, e.g., Abhijit Pandya, Why A Burka Ban Defends the Rights of Women, 
MAIL ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-
2076544/Why-Burka-ban-defends-rights-women.html; see also Nabiha Meher Sheikh, In 
Support of the Burqa Ban, CHANGING UP PAKISTAN (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2011/04/19/in-support-of-the-burqa-ban-
nabiha-meher-sheikh/. 
 9 Mahfouz & Brown, supra note 2. 
 10 See, e.g., Sehmina Jaffer Chopra, Liberation by the Veil, ISLAM101, 
http://www.islam101.com/women/hijbene.html (“Contrary to popular belief, the 
covering of the Muslim woman is not oppression but a liberation from the shackles of 
male scrutiny and the standards of attractiveness. In Islam, a woman is free to be who 
she is inside, and immuned [sic] from being portrayed as [a] sex symbol and lusted 
after.”); see also YOUNG MUSLIMS, HIJAB: FABRIC, FAD OR FAITH?, available at 
http://web.youngmuslims.ca/brochures/hijab.pdf. 
 11 This note will be limited to a discussion of veils that cover the face and 
leave the identity of the wearer in question. Thus, this includes burqas, which cover 
the entire face with a mesh screen across the eyes allowing the wearer to see, as well as 
niqabs, which cover the entire face with an open slit through which the eyes are seen. 
The note will not address headscarves that cover only the face and neck and allow the 
face to be seen.  
 12 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning 
(June 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
cairo-university-6-04-09. 
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questions about banning the burqa as a security measure, 
explained that “if you are looking at other countries that are 
understandably nervous about extremist activity, like France 
and other European countries, I think it’s a close question.”13 
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause provides 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion] . . . .”14 The Free Exercise Clause is 
afforded extraordinary respect in light of the persecution and 
intolerance that led the drafters to include this protection in 
the Bill of Rights.15 Indeed, America has historically provided a 
haven from religious persecution, attracting immigrants from 
around the world with the promise of a country where all 
religions are accepted and embraced. In the Supreme Court’s 
words, “The principle that government may not enact laws that 
suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that 
few violations are recorded in our opinions.”16 Nevertheless, 
while the Court has always held that the First Amendment 
protects religious beliefs, its protection of religious practices has 
varied. In one of its earliest decisions on the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Court explained that it “embraces two concepts—
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but 
in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”17 Accordingly, in 
order to receive protection under the Free Exercise Clause, 
religious practice must be sincerely held and fit within a 
person’s own definition of a religious belief.18 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that it is not for the court to 
determine what constitutes a religious belief.19  
An absolute federal ban on face veils in public, such as 
the law enacted in France, would be unconstitutional in the 
United States.20 A law that prohibits an activity for the purpose 
  
 13 Dan Oakes, Burqa Ban Has Merit, Says Clinton, AGE (Austl.) (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.theage.com.au/national/burqa-ban-has-merit-says-clinton-20101107-17iyl.html. 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 532 (1993) (listing sources supporting this claim). 
 16 Id. at 523. 
 17 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).  
 18 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what he 
believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be 
tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s ‘Supreme Being’ or the truth of his 
concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government.”). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War? 
The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 339-40 (2006) (arguing 
that although textually, France and the United States have similar freedom of religion 
protections, a few key differences point to why a ban similar to France’s would be 
declared unconstitutional in the United States). 
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of discriminating against a religion is invalid.21 Even a law that 
is facially neutral but otherwise evidences a purpose of 
infringing upon religious practices would be invalid—unless the 
government can identify a compelling governmental interest 
that the law is narrowly tailored to advance.22 In 1993, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),23 
which prohibits the federal government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion—even if the law is 
generally applicable—unless the government can prove that, as 
applied to the person, the law furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.24 Consequently, a national ban on face 
veils in public would be overbroad and would not be the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental 
interest.  
Although a ban on face veils in public would be 
unconstitutional in the United States, is it possible that a ban 
might be constitutional in a context where the government has 
enjoyed more discretion historically? In the public school 
domain, the government has a compelling interest in providing a 
proper school environment and has latitude to regulate to 
achieve that goal.25 Courts defer, under certain circumstances, to 
school-board determinations regarding how public schools 
should be regulated.26 Indeed, schools possess greater authority 
over students’ behavior, dress, and activities than the state may 
have over its adult citizens in their daily lives.27 Accordingly, 
  
 21 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533.  
 22 Id. 
 23 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). Though this law was declared 
unconstitutional as applied to states and local government, it is still applicable to the 
federal government. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American 
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of 
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 
declares, ‘Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.’”); 
see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, 
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Epperson v. State of Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and 
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local 
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which 
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) 
(“[S]imply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to 
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while students do not give up all of their rights, it is understood 
that they do not receive the same protections as adults in 
society.28 Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence has shown 
that schools must remain neutral where religion is concerned: 
they may not support, protect, oppose, or disadvantage one 
religious doctrine or practice over another.29 
This note argues that in public schools—an area where 
the government has legitimate, compelling interests that could 
justify infringing upon the free exercise of religion—a general 
ban on face coverings would be constitutional.30 This applies 
primarily to public high schools and universities, since women 
who wear a face veil generally begin to do so around puberty.31 
Part I provides a general background on Muslim veils. Part II 
  
adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be 
permitted to children in a public school. . . . [C]onstitutional rights of students in public 
schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 28 See, e.g., id. (holding that a school was within its rights to discipline 
student for using offensively lewd and indecent speech, and that such discipline did not 
violate student’s First Amendment free speech rights); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In light of the history of American 
public education, it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment ‘freedom 
of speech’ encompasses a student’s right to speak in public schools.”).  
 29 RICHARD C. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 198 (1984). 
 30 A restriction on face coverings in public schools has not, as of this writing, 
been challenged in the court system. However, this does not diminish the importance of 
hypothesizing a situation in which this may occur. The Supreme Court has not often 
applied the Free Exercise Clause in the school context, but when it has, its decisions 
have shown that there is concern that precedents in schools may extend outside of the 
school system. The Court has expressed concerns that lowering constitutional 
protections in schools will subsequently lead to lowering constitutional protections 
elsewhere. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1389-90 (2000).  
[I]n [Supreme Court cases addressing free speech, Fourth Amendment privacy, 
and due process], schools are seen as unique institutions for which special rules 
can be created without setting precedent for other contexts. But in [Supreme 
Court cases addressing Equal Protection, Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clause], schools are seen as representative institutions, where constitutional 
rights must, if anything, be more scrupulously observed lest the Court create a 
precedent in the school context that could be applied outside of it.  
Id. The fact that this note argues that a ban on face coverings would be constitutional 
does not answer the question of whether this is a precedent that should be set. It is 
even more important given that restrictions on Muslim face veils seem to be spreading 
around the world at a steady pace over the past two years. This note does not address 
whether such a ban is politically, morally, or socially advisable. It merely attempts to 
look at the issue of the ban on face veils and address whether the United States 
constitution would permit such a ban in the area of public schools. 
 31 Zara Syed, Hijab: When to Begin?, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS (Feb. 23, 2009, 8:58 
PM), http://islamicinsights.com/religion/religion/hijab-when-to-begin.html (“[G]irls don’t 
have to observe the Hijab until they become Baligh [the age of puberty in Islam] . . . .”).  
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then examines some of the common issues the veil presents and 
explores how these issues have been addressed by legislatures in 
Europe and by courts in the United States. Next, Part III 
describes the history of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and 
shows where the law stands today. Part IV then turns to the 
public education arena and explores the greater role that 
government plays in public schools. Finally, Part V proposes a 
hypothetical regulation prohibiting face veils in schools, 
analyzes the opposing interests at play, and shows that, whether 
under minimal scrutiny or some form of strict scrutiny, such a 
neutral, generally applicable regulation would survive a 
constitutional challenge. 
I. BACKGROUND OF MUSLIM FEMALE HIJAB 
According to the Pew Research Center, 23 percent of the 
world’s population in 2009 identified as Muslim, amounting to 
a total of 1.57 billion people.32 People who practice the Muslim 
faith live on all six inhabited continents, and one-fifth of the 
global Muslim population lives in countries where Islam is not 
the most practiced religion.33 Members of the non-Muslim 
community often develop assumptions and misconceptions 
regarding the role of women in Islam.34 Even among Muslim 
countries, there are different interpretations of the woman’s 
role in society. The difference is most evident when comparing 
countries such as Afghanistan,35 where women have historically 
been oppressed, to Southeast Asian Muslim countries where 
women are active economic participants.36 One explanation for 
these misconceptions lies in the distinction between “Muslim 
culture” and “Islamic culture.”37 While Islamic culture “adheres 
  
 32 Of those 1.57 billion, more than 60 percent are in Asia and about 20 
percent are concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa. In the United States, 
the Muslim population totals around 2,450,000, or 0.8 percent of the U.S. population. 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION 1, 25 (2009), available 
at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslimpopulation.pdf. 
 33 Id. 
 34 This note will not fully examine the role of women in Islam. For further 
information about this subject, see generally ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN IN ISLAM (2d ed. New Dawn Press Group 2004). 
 35 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
REPORT ON THE TALIBAN’S WAR AGAINST WOMEN 1 (2001). 
 36 ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER, THE QUR’AN, WOMEN AND MODERN SOCIETY 60 (2d 
ed. 2005).  
 37 Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the 
Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, 447 (2008). 
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to the tenets of Islamic principles” as found in the Qur’an, 
Muslim culture is defined by “the way adherents to the Islamic 
faith practice the religion.”38 Thus, the way observers interpret 
the religious tenets (Islamic culture) can be manifested through 
different forms of practice (Muslim culture). Accordingly, 
particular Muslim cultures may unduly influence the way the 
rest of the world perceives Islam in general. Both Islamic and 
Muslim cultures, however, accept the principle that the Qur’an 
emphasizes the chastity of women and thus urges women to be 
modest in their behavior and dress.39 Indeed, the Prophet 
Muhammad is quoted as having said that each religion has a 
distinctive quality, and the quality of Islam is modesty.40 
The Qur’an tells Muslim women to be modest by 
following hijab. Hijab is a modesty concept that includes 
physical aspects, such as covering the hair and the body, as 
well as mental aspects, including modesty in one’s thoughts, 
actions, and speech.41 Hijab, as stated by one scholar, is “a 
woman’s assertion that judgment of her physical person is to 
play no role in social interaction.”42 In that way, the focus is 
instead on a woman’s person and spirituality.43 Muslim women, 
however, interpret hijab’s requirements for clothing in various 
ways. The Institute of Islamic Information and Education 
states that while there is no single standard for the type of 
clothing a woman must wear, there are several minimum 
requirements.44 One requirement is that certain parts of the 
body must be covered.45 Further, clothing must be loose enough 
that the shape of the body cannot be discerned and thick 
enough that the color of the skin cannot be seen.46 In countries 
that interpret the Qur’an very strictly, such as Saudi Arabia, a 
woman may be punished solely for leaving her home without a 
veil.47 Women’s dress in some Arab countries such as Egypt, 
Pakistan, and Iraq, can vary greatly between rural areas—
  
 38 Id. 
 39 ENGINEER, supra note 36, at 68. 
 40 The Ideal Muslim in the Community, ISLAMWEB ENG. (Oct. 25, 2009), 
http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=articles&id=65899. 
 41 Mary Ali, Why Do Muslim Women Cover Their Head?, INST. ISLAMIC INFO. 
& EDUC., http://www.iiie.net/index.php?q=node/37. 
 42 Naheed Mustafa, My Body Is My Own Business, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), 
June 29, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.jannah.org/sisters/naheed.html.  
 43 Ali, supra note 41.  
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 ENGINEER, supra note 36, at 68. 
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where the attire is very traditional—and cities—where the 
clothing can be fairly modern.48 In countries where women are 
significant economic players, such as Muslim countries in 
Southeast Asia, women might not be veiled at all.49 Although one 
commentator has observed that “veiling is more of a socio-cultural 
than purely religious practice,”50 a woman’s interpretation of her 
religion is generally what compels her to wear a veil or not.51  
The passage in the Qur’an that governs which parts of a 
woman’s body may be exposed is verse 24:31.52 It states, “[a]nd 
say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and 
guard their private parts and not display their ornaments except 
what appears thereof, and let them wear their head-coverings 
over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments . . . .”53 The 
phrase at issue is ma zahara minha, or in English, “what 
appears thereof.”54 Some scholars interpret this passage, along 
with other evidence from Islamic texts, as requiring women to 
veil their faces.55 Other scholars have interpreted the passage to 
mean a number of different things, including that: a woman 
should show only her external clothing and keep everything else 
covered, including her face; a woman may expose her eyes and 
hands; and a woman may show her face, ears, neck, and 
bracelets, among various other combinations.56 The scholars who 
believe that women must be fully covered, including their faces, 
point to various passages in the Qur’an to support their 
conclusion.57 Nevertheless, a mandatory face veil is viewed as 
the least accepted interpretation, since the four main schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence believe that it is not required.58  
  
 48 Id. at 59-60. 
 49 Id. at 60. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Martin Asser, Why Muslim Women Wear the Veil, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2006, 
8:01 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5411320.stm. 
 52 MAULVI MUHAMMAD ALI, THE HOLY QUR-AN: CONTAINING THE ARABIC 
TEXT WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 701-02 (2d ed. 1920). 
 53 Id. 
 54 ENGINEER, supra note 36, at 61. 
 55 Religions: Niqab, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/ 
beliefs/niqab_1.shtml (last updated Sept. 22, 2011). 
 56 ENGINEER, supra note 36, at 61 (explaining different interpretations as 
written by Muhammad Jarir Tabari, a prominent Qur’an commentator, in Jami’al 
Bayan’an Ta’wil Ayah al-Qur’an).  
 57 Chris Moore, The Burqa—Islamic or Cultural?, TRUE ISLAM, http://www.quran-
islam.org/articles/part_3/the_burqa_(P1357).html. 
 58 Religions: Niqab, supra note 55. 
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II. ISSUES POSED BY THE VEIL AND VARIOUS EUROPEAN AND 
U.S. REGULATIONS 
The Muslim face veil raises various considerations for 
legislators evaluating a ban. As an initial matter, legislators 
may worry that the face veil poses threats to security and 
women’s rights.59 Moreover, legislators may worry that the face 
veil runs counter to core beliefs of Western societies. 
Nevertheless, while the most oft-cited rationale for the ban is 
that the veil is contrary to Western principles and behavior, it 
remains to be seen whether a ban is a truly appropriate 
measure to address the concerns that the veil raises.  
A. Security 
A recurring concern for the face veil is that it poses a 
potential security threat. Any person covering his or her face 
may benefit from the ability to hide his or her identity. For 
example, in a separate context, the United States has a federal 
anti-mask law,60 as do many states,61 because the inability to 
identify a person can often prove problematic. Although it is 
less common in the United States, individuals throughout the 
world have used Muslim face veils and loose clothing to conceal 
themselves in order to facilitate crime. This happens most 
frequently in Pakistan.62 There, suicide bombers take 
  
 59 Indeed, the Belgian legislation justified the enactment of the veil ban on 
the basis of security. Belgian Ban Burqa-Type Dress; Law Cites Public Security, Securing 
Emancipation of Women, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
world/2010/04/29/belgiums-lower-house-parliament-supports-burqa-ban-question-
arises-senate/. This is not an arbitrary concern given that in Pakistan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, there have been instances of criminals using the 
burqa in order to facilitate crimes. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.  
 60 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). 
 61 See generally Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask 
Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819 (1991). Each of these laws has 
exceptions for masks used in celebrations, occupationally, during sporting events, for 
plays, etc. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-9(a)(4); FLA. STAT. §§ 876.12, 876.13 (although 
these two provisions were called into question by Nicol v. State, 939 So. 2d 231, 233 n.2 
(Fla. 2006), and § 876.13 was declared unconstitutional by Robinson v. State, 393 So. 
2d 1076 (Fla. 1980), the Florida legislature enacted § 876.155 which adds a mens rea 
element in the application of the anti-mask statutes); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38(a); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.396 (1979); MINN. STAT. § 609.735 
(1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.7, 14-12.8, 14-12.11 (1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 
(McKinney 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1301 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-422 (1988); 
W. VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (1989).  
 62 See, e.g., Intikhab Amir, Burqa-clad Terrorists Threaten Sanctity of Female 
Dress Code, AL-SHORFA (Iraq) (July 12, 2011), http://al-shorfa.com/cocoon/ 
meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/main/2011/07/12/feature-01; see also Rob Crilly, 
Burqa-Clad Female Suicide Bomber Detonates in Pakistan, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 11, 2011, 11:28 
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advantage of the fact that the veil conceals their identities and 
allows them to be mistaken for women, enabling them to 
infiltrate crowded areas and conceal weapons beneath their 
clothing.63 While this may seem easier to accomplish in a 
country where women wearing burqas is the norm rather than 
the exception, the phenomenon is not limited to Pakistan. 
In the United States, there have been cases of women 
robbing banks64 and gas stations65 while using veils to hide their 
identity. A Philadelphia police officer was killed while responding 
to a burglary carried out by two men wearing burqas.66 Similar 
cases of robberies involving criminals disguised in burqas have 
occurred in Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and France.67 
Three robbers in Ontario were dubbed the “burqa bandits” after 
they robbed a jewelry store in clothing described as “loose-fitting 
material which covered their bodies and faces.”68 Following the 
attempted suicide bombings in London in 2005, prosecutors 
believed that one of the attackers had escaped in a burqa, 
disguising himself as a woman.69 In a separate incident, a man 
was accused of having fled the country disguised as a woman in 
full Muslim clothing and veil after he was wanted for questioning 
in connection with the murder of a female British police officer.70  
Of course, all of these occurrences involve criminals 
tainting a religious practice in order to carry out illegal 
activities. Accordingly, it would be both an absolute 
overgeneralization and a tremendous injustice to claim that 
Muslim garb is a tool of criminals. On the other hand, these 
incidents show that the possibility that criminals will leverage 
religious practices to carry out illicit objectives cannot be 
  
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8694814/Burka-clad-female-
suicide-bomber-detonates-in-Pakistan.html; Pakistan Frets over Burqa Bombers, 
TWOCIRCLES.NET (Aug. 13, 2011, 12:23 PM), http://twocircles.net/2011aug13/search_ 
women_burqa_without_exception_pakistani_daily.html. 
 63 Crilly, supra note 62; Pakistan Frets over Burqa Bombers, supra note 62.  
 64 Police: Woman Wearing Burqa Robbed Banks, NBC10 PHILA. (Dec. 13, 
2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Police-Woman-Wearing-
Burqa-Robbed-Banks-111760804.html. 
 65 Dana DiFillipo, Bandit in Burka Foiled in Gas Station Robbery Try, 
PHILLY.COM (July 20, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/dncrime/Bandit-
in-burka-foiled-in-gas-station-robbery-try.html. 
 66 Officer Down: Sgt. Stephen Liczbinski, POLICEONE.COM (May 5, 2008), 
http://www.policeone.com/officer-down/1692264/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
 67 Lynn Curwin, “Burqa Bandits” on CCTV as They Rob Jewellery Store, 
DIGITAL J. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://digitaljournal.com/article/301625; see also English 
Schools Ban, supra note 6. 
 68 Curwin, supra note 67. 
 69 English Schools Ban, supra note 6. 
 70 Id. 
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ignored. The delicate takeaway is to acknowledge that security 
concerns exist when individuals, including students, cannot be 
readily identified by the public.  
B. Women’s Rights 
Another compelling concern for the face veil is whether 
it facilitates the oppression of women. Commentators suggest 
that veiling women’s faces limits how they can contribute in 
Western society and thus facilitates their subjugation.71 Access 
to certain jobs, educational opportunities, and other elements of 
the Western way of life are potentially restricted when a woman 
wears a veil. Although not universally believed, many view the 
face veil as a way to repress women, precisely because it 
prevents them from joining society in a way they could without 
the veil.72 Certainly, this was the goal of the Taliban when its 
adherents—acting as the government of Afghanistan—required 
women to wear burqas.73 Many argue that women who wear face 
veils do not wear them voluntarily but instead wear them out of 
obligation, whether they owe that obligation to their father, 
their husband, or their government.74 Advocates for a ban on face 
veils claim that women will never achieve gender equality if 
they have a piece of cloth between themselves and society.75  
Of course, saying that all women are forced to wear a 
face veil would again be an overbroad generalization.76 Some 
women have spoken out about their choice to wear a face veil, 
viewing it as freeing, comforting, and egalitarian.77 They claim 
  
 71 See, e.g., Saira Khan, Why I, as a British Muslim Woman, Want the Burkha 
Banned From Our Streets, MAIL ONLINE (June 24, 2009, 2:40 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
debate/article-1195052/Why-I-British-Muslim-woman-want-burkha-banned-
streets.html (“The veil is simply a tool of oppression which is being used to alienate and 
control women under the guise of religious freedom.”). 
 72 See, e.g., Bernard-Henri Lévy, Why I Support a Ban on Burqas, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
bernardhenri-levy/why-i-support-a-ban-on-bu_b_463192.html (“The burqa is not a 
dress, it’s a message, one that clearly communicates the subjugation, the subservience, 
the crushing and the defeat of women.”). 
 73 Simon Robinson, What Do Afghan Women Want, TIME (Mar. 29, 2002), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,221036,00.html. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See, e.g., Virginia Haussegger, Ban Un-Australian Burqa, CANBERRA 
TIMES (Austl.) (June 27, 2009), available at http://www.virginiahaussegger.com.au/ 
column_details.php?id=137.  
 76 See, e.g., Shazia N. Nagamia, Islamic Feminism: Unveiling the Western 
Stigma, 11 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 37 (2004) (questioning whether the “norm of a Muslim 
woman’s freedom [should] be dictated by the demands of a Western feministic ideology”).  
 77 See, e.g., Mustafa, supra note 42 (stating that choosing to wear clothing 
that covers all but her face and hands gives her freedom); see also Nesrine Malik, 
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that prohibiting women from wearing a face veil is just as 
abhorrent as forcing them to wear one.78 However, the 
implications of this debate are most pronounced in societies 
where wearing a veil puts women at a disadvantage because it 
prevents them from fully participating in all aspects of society. 
In many of the Western societies that have enacted bans, it is a 
fundamental principle that all citizens are equal, no matter 
their race, religion, or sex.79 A woman’s access to some—
perhaps many—jobs is likely to be hindered by wearing a veil, 
as is the ability to fully participate in society. Thus, women 
who wear a face veil are bound to encounter difficulty realizing 
the equality guaranteed to all citizens by such societies.  
C. European Approaches to the Face Veil  
Both women’s rights and security issues have been at the 
forefront of the discussion in European countries considering a 
burqa ban. Many of these countries’ reactions show that 
governments have serious reservations as to whether the 
Muslim face veil can be worn in their societies. The most 
controversial example comes from France. On April 11, 2011, Loi 
2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010, entitled “interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public,”80 went into effect. 
The law’s language specifically provides that no person shall 
wear clothing designed to cover his or her face in public.81 
  
Burka Ban: Why Must I Cast Off the Veil?, TELEGRAPH (July 17, 2010, 11:19 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/7896536/Burka-ban-Why-must-I-
cast-off-the-veil.html. 
 78 See, e.g., Mustafa, supra note 42; see also Malik, supra note 77.  
 79 For example, article 1 of the French Constitution ensures “equality of all 
citizens before the law” and promotes “equal access by women and men to elective offices 
and posts as well as to position[s] of professional and social responsibility.” 1958 CONST. 1 
(Fr.). Article 3 of the German Constitution states “No one may be prejudiced or favored 
because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his 
faith or his religious or political opinions.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, art. III. 
 80 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage 
dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Covering of 
the Face in Public Spaces], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&cate
gorieLien=id. 
 81 Id. at art. 1. Exceptions are made for any clothing that is authorized by 
legislative or regulatory provisions; justified for health or professional reasons; 
required for sporting activities, celebrations, artistic or traditional events, and 
demonstrations. Id. at art. 2. Fines of €150 are imposed on those who violate the law, 
and can be as much as €30,000 and jail time for those who impose wearing the veil on 
others because of their sex. Id. at art. 4. 
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Although the law does not specifically mention the burqa, its 
exceptions reveal why it is widely considered to be France’s 
“burqa ban.”82 In a speech given before Parliament in June 
2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that “the burqa is not a 
sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be 
welcome on the territory of the French republic.”83  
France caused a similar uproar in 2004 when it enacted a 
law that prohibits wearing symbols or clothing that 
conspicuously display religious affiliation in public elementary, 
middle, and high schools.84 Though this law applies generally to 
all religious affiliations, it is considered the hijab ban in light of 
the discourse leading up to its enactment.85 Both this and the 
ban on the face veil are founded on France’s fundamental 
principle of laïcité, which in broad terms can be understood as 
secularism.86 In France, religion is kept in the private sphere and 
should not interfere in public life.87 This lies in stark contrast to 
  
 82 See, e.g., John Paul Putney, France Burqa Ban to Take Effect April 11, 
JURIST (Mar. 4, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/03/france-burqa-ban-
to-take-effect-april-11.php; see also  Steven Erlanger, France Enforces Ban on Full-Face 
Veils in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html; Larisa Epatko, France’s Burqa Ban Met With 
Scattered Protests and Arrests, PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 15, 2011, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/04/france-veil-ban.html 
 83 President Nicolas Sarkozy, Statement to Parliament in Congress (June 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.senat.fr/seances/s200906/s20090622/s20090622002.html#SOM5. 
 84 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de 
laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appurtenance religieuse dans les 
écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 14, 2004 Concerning, as an 
Application of the Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing 
Showing Religious Affiliation in Public Primary and Secondary Schools], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 
17, 2004, p. 5190, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid= 
392F66470290A187E301F41941F73F27.tpdjo17v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000041797
7&categorieLien=id. 
 85 COMMISSION DE RÉFLEXION SUR L’APPLICATION DU PRINCIPE DE LAÏCITÉ DANS 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE, RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE [COMM’N ON THE APPLICATION OF 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM IN THE REPUBLIC, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC] (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/ 
storage/rapports-publics//034000725/0000.pdf. 
 86 The concept of laïcité is difficult to translate or define in English. T. 
Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and 
France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420 n.2 (2004). Jean-Pierre Raffarin, when he was 
Prime Minister, described it as “the syntax, the code by which all religions can live and 
peacefully enter into a dialogue within our Republican State.” Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Prime 
Minister of Fr., Speech to the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France 
[Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France] (Jan. 31, 2004) (translation 
available at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Speech-by-M-Jean-Pierre-Raffarin.html). 
 87 Blandine Kriegel, former advisor to French President Jacques Chirac and 
the chairperson of the High Council on Integration, was quoted as saying:  
[In France, religion is seen as] organized, bounded, orderly, contained in its 
buildings and defined by worship practices in those buildings. If it strays into 
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the United States, where practicing religion in the public sphere 
is accepted and protected by the First Amendment.  
The burqa debate is not confined to France.88 In 2011, 
Belgium became the second European country to essentially 
ban wearing a burqa or niqab.89 The Belgian law, which was 
justified on security grounds by some public ministers and on 
women’s equality grounds by others, bans clothing that 
conceals a person’s identity.90 Various other countries have 
pursued similar measures. In Italy, a parliamentary 
commission approved a draft law that would ban a veil that 
covers one’s face.91 In Spain, a proposed ban on wearing a burqa 
made its way to the Senate, where it was eventually rejected by 
a 183-162 vote.92 In Barcelona and several other smaller 
Spanish towns, however, individuals are prohibited from 
wearing a face veil in public buildings.93 In September 2011, the 
Dutch government introduced legislation that would ban face-
covering veils94 and stated that “the wearing of clothing that 
completely or almost entirely covers the face is fundamentally 
at odds with public life, where people are recognized by their 
  
the street, selling tracts or proselytizing, it is out of bounds, and even when it 
is tolerated it is no longer protected by the French constitution and can easily 
be quashed in the name of protecting public order.  
Britton D. Davis, Lifting the Veil: France’s New Crusade, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
117, 123 (2011) (citing JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: 
ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 13-14 (2007)).  
 88 See generally The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (June 15, 2010, 
11:30 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5414098.stm. 
 89 The Belgium Ban on Full Veils Comes into Force, BBC NEWS (July 23, 
2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14261921 (Belgian ban 
enacted with only two abstentions on “the grounds of security, to allow police to identify 
people . . . [and because] face veils . . . [are] a symbol of the oppression of women”). 
 90 Id. The Belgian law imposes a fine of €137.50 for any violation. Id. 
 91 Italy Approves Draft Law to Ban Burqa, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2011, 9:54 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/03/italy-draft-law-burqa (the proposed 
law would “expand a decades-old law that for security reasons prohibits people from 
wearing face-covering items such as masks in public places.”). 
 92 Two members of the Spanish Senate abstained from that vote. Ann Riley, 
Spain Lower House Rejects Proposal to Ban Burqa, JURIST (July 21, 2010, 7:55 AM), 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/07/spain-lower-house-rejects-proposal-to-ban-burqa.php. 
 93 See, e.g., Spanish City Bans Face-covering Islamic Veils in Public 
Buildings, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2010, 7:55 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ 
dec/09/spanish-city-bans-islamic-veils-public. 
 94 See, e.g., Dutch to Ban Full-Face Veils, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, at A6; see 
also Dutch Plan Ban, supra note 6. 
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faces.”95 Because of the recent change in ruling parties, 
however, this legislation may be removed from consideration.96  
In England, a country with a rapidly growing Muslim 
population,97 both sides of the debate have strong support, 
including from Muslim women98 and Muslim groups.99 The 
controversy was first sparked in 2006 when it was revealed 
that Jack Straw, a British Cabinet Minister, had asked female 
constituents to remove their veils during meetings in his 
office.100 Moreover, former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
has called the face veil a “mark of separation.”101 Another 
legislator, Philip Hollobone, proposed legislation to ban the 
wearing of a burqa in public.102 In 2007, the British Department 
for Education and Skills released guidelines giving teachers 
full discretion to decide what students may wear in the 
classroom.103 According to these guidelines, if a teacher believes 
that the way a student is dressed “imposes on a child’s ability 
to learn or is a safety or security issue,” the teacher may 
prohibit such clothing in the classroom.104  
Other parts of Europe have also witnessed controversy 
over Muslim religious garb in the classroom. Several German 
states have prohibited teachers from wearing a hijab105 while 
  
 95 Dutch to Ban Full-Face Veils, supra note 94. 
 96 Gilbert Kreijger, Dutch Burqa Ban May Go After Government Falls, 
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-dutch-
politics-immigration-idUSBRE83O17620120425. 
 97 HOUSSAIN KETTANI, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH HAWAII INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTS AND HUMANITIES: 2010 MUSLIM POPULATION (Jan. 2010), 
available at http://www.pupr.edu/hkettani/papers/HICAH2010.pdf. 
 98 See, e.g., Saira Khan, Why I, As a British Muslim Woman, Want the 
Burkha Banned from Our Streets, MAIL ONLINE (June 24, 2009, 2:40 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1195052/Why-I-British-Muslim-woman-
want-burkha-banned-streets.html; see also Malik, supra note 77. 
 99 English Schools Ban, supra note 6 (Rajnaara Akhtar, head of the Protect-
Hijab group in England stated, “I think the individuals who want to wear the niqab 
should exercise a degree of flexibility.”). 
 100 “Remove Full Veils” Urges Straw, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2006, 7:28 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5411954.stm (explaining that face veils could “make 
community relations more difficult.”). 
 101 Alan Cowell, Blair Criticizes Full Islamic Veils as “Mark of Separation,” 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/ 
world/europe/18britain.html. 
 102 Ban the Burka, Says Tory MP Philip Hollobone, TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2010, 
7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7864697/Ban-the-burka-says-Tory-
MP-Philip-Hollobone.html. 
 103 English Schools Ban, supra note 6. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Hijab here refers to a cloth that covers the hair and sometimes neck, as 
opposed to the modesty concept discussed supra notes 41-51. 
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teaching.106 These bans stem from a unique social and 
governance system in Germany. The German Constitution, called 
the Basic Law, guarantees the freedom of religion and equal 
treatment of people regardless of their religious beliefs.107 
Germany does not require strict separation of church and state, 
and in many circumstances, the Basic Law requires cooperation 
between the two.108 This includes the area of religious education in 
public schools.109 Public schools are largely multidenominational 
but provide optional courses in Christianity.110 Christian symbols, 
such as nuns’ habits and crosses, can be found in classrooms and 
have been permitted by the courts.111 In Germany, regulation of 
the school system is delegated to the Länder, or German states.112 
Thus, individual states made the decision to ban the hijab. The 
impetus for banning the headscarf in German schools was a case 
known as the Teacher Headscarf Case.113 In 1988, an elementary 
school teacher, Fereshta Ludin, was denied employment because 
she wore a headscarf.114 The case made its way to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which declared that she had a 
fundamental right under Article 3 of the Basic Law to wear a 
headscarf.115 Despite this, the court left open the possibility that 
the legislature could enact a law prohibiting religious garb as 
long as it was neutral and had a “sufficiently clear legal 
  
 106 See Ruben Seth Fogel, Note, Headscarves in German Public Schools: 
Religious Minorities are Welcome in Germany Unless—God Forbid—They are Religious, 
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 619, 640-41 (2006–2007). 
 107 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art. III, cl. 3, translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 15 (Oct. 2010, Christian Tomuschat et al., trans.) (“No 
person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, 
homeland and origin, faith or religious or political opinions.”); id. art. IV, cl. 1-2 
(“Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical 
creed, shall be inviolable. The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.”); 
see also Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves From French 
Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 251, 274-75 (2006). 
 108 See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the 
United States, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2004). 
 109 See, e.g., Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in 
Germany and in the United States, 28 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 405, 456 (2000). 
 110 See, e.g., Walterick, supra note 107, at 270-71. 
 111 Id. at 271. 
 112 See, e.g., Muehlhoff, supra note 109, at 454-55. 
 113 See, e.g., Cindy Skach, Religious Freedom–State Neutrality–Public Order–
Role of International Standards in Interpreting and Implementing Constitutionally 
Guaranteed Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 186, 190 (2006). 
 114 See Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 665, 672-73 (2004).  
 115 Article 3 of the Basic law guarantees, among other things, equal treatment 
no matter one’s religion. See id. at 676. 
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basis.”116 Almost immediately following this decision, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Baden-
Wuerttemberg, and Saarland enacted bans.117 After further 
litigation in October 2004, the German Federal Administrative 
Court held that bans on religious symbols must be neutral and 
may not single out any religion.118  
Further indication that officials are concerned over the 
veil in schools comes from Sweden. Although the Swedish 
National Agency for Education stated that a ban on religious 
headgear in schools constitutes religious discrimination, it 
nevertheless determined that schools would be allowed to ban 
the burqa because it “impede[d] teacher-pupil communication.”119  
D. Face Veil Conflicts in the United States 
To address this issue, the United States has instituted 
several administrative and legal rules that require the face to 
be shown in a few narrow circumstances.120 One circumstance 
occurs in the context of driver’s license photographs. In 2001, 
Sultaana Freeman, who had converted to Islam at the age of 
thirty and who wore a niqab, was denied a driver’s license in 
Florida because she refused to sit for the photograph without a 
niqab.121 At trial, expert witnesses for the state claimed that 
under Islamic faith, exceptions to the veil requirement could be 
made under certain circumstances, while Freeman argued that 
the doctrine of necessity did not apply for a driver’s license 
photograph.122 The court held that the state’s photograph 
requirement did not impose a substantial burden on Freeman’s 
exercise of religion.123 In a previous case, the court defined a 
substantial burden on religion as “one that either compels the 
  
 116 See Eberle, supra note 108, at 1064; see also von Campenhausen, supra 
note 113, at 676. 
 117 See, e.g., Walterick, supra note 107, at 274-75. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Swedish Education Agency Rejects Veil Ban, LOCAL (Swed.) (Jan. 
23, 2007, 11:00 AM), http://www.thelocal.se/6181/20070123/#. 
 120 There have been many more cases of Muslim women and girls being 
prohibited from wearing a headscarf under certain circumstances. This note will 
address only a few cases where the issue has come up with respect to the face veil. For 
a more detailed discussion of conflicts involving hijabs in prisons, in airports during 
searches by the Transportation Security Administration, and at sporting events, see 
Abdo, supra note 37, at 484-500. 
 121 Freeman violated Florida’s requirement of having full-face photographs on 
driver’s licenses by wearing a face veil. Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor 
Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 122 Id. at 52. 
 123 Id. at 57. 
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religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion 
forbids, or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion 
requires.”124 The court reasoned that, based on expert testimony 
stating that Islamic law permits the removal of the veil in some 
circumstances, requiring Freeman to remove her veil for the 
photograph did not substantially burden her free exercise of 
religion.125 The court acknowledged that she was 
“inconvenienc[ed]” by the state requirement, but because Islam 
does not forbid all photographs, the court held that she was not 
being required to do something her religion forbids.126  
Another illustration of the conflict between the Muslim 
face veil and legal requirements occurred in the courtroom.127 In 
2009, Ginnah Muhammad, an African American convert to 
Islam who chose to wear a niqab, was called to testify in 
support of her suit in small claims court.128 Her claim was 
dismissed after she refused the judge’s request to remove her 
face veil.129 The judge’s reasoning was based on his 
understanding that the niqab was “a custom thing” and not an 
obligation of the Islamic faith.130 Muhammad insisted that, for 
her, it was for religious reasons and refused to remove her face 
veil.131 This issue has also arisen for Muslim jurors, members of 
the public who attend the court session, and other litigants,132 
but it has never arisen in the public school context.133 
  
 124 Id. at 55 (quoting Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1033 
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125 Id. at 57. 
 126 Id. 
 127 This note gives one example of when a face veil in the courtroom became 
an issue. For additional examples and analysis of the face veil in courts, see Adam 
Schwartzbaum, The Niqab in the Courtroom: Protecting Free Exercise of Religion in a 
Post-Smith World, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2011). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Jeff Karoub, Muslim Woman Sues Judge Over Veil, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 
2007, 5:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/28/ 
AR2007032801801_pf.html. 
 130 Schwartzbaum, supra note 127, at 1534. 
 131 Karoub, supra note 129. 
 132 See Abdo, supra note 37, at 484-500. 
 133 There have, however, been several clashes between school officials and 
Muslim females wearing hijabs (here, veils covering the hair and neck) in schools, but 
none of them have resulted in litigation. See id. at 466-70 (citing incidents in 
Oklahoma in 2003, Louisiana in 2004, California in 2004 and 2007, and New Jersey in 
2003, in which Muslim females were either suspended, asked to remove their hijabs, 
“humiliated” by school staff, or not allowed to attend a military academy due to their 
hijabs). In one case that ended up in court, a female challenged her school’s no-hat rule 
because it interfered with her ability to wear a cultural headwrap. Isaacs v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Howard Cnty., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Md. 1999). Isaacs, however, did not 
implicate the Free Exercise Clause. 
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III. THE VEIL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE  
The United States takes a unique approach to the 
Muslim face veil. In many of the countries that have enacted a 
whole or partial ban on face veils, the separation of church and 
state is strict, whereas that separation is less strict in the 
United States. As stated above, in France, religion is relegated 
to the personal sphere,134 while in Germany, the Basic Law does 
not implement complete separation of church and state, though 
religion is recognized to have a “special role in the Nation’s 
public life.”135 In the United States, the First Amendment’s 
protection of religious freedom accommodates religion where its 
European counterparts may not. 
A. Summary 
Article VI is the only section of the original Constitution 
that contains a provision regarding religious freedom. Article 
VI forbids the use of a religious test to determine a candidate’s 
qualification to hold an office or position within the Federal 
Government.136 However, the Bill of Rights introduced two 
clauses pertaining to religious freedom: the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The two clauses together 
provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”137 Because wearing a face veil constitutes a religious 
practice, this note will focus on the Free Exercise clause, which 
prohibits the government from imposing burdens or providing 
benefits to people solely because of their religious beliefs. 
The text of the Free Exercise Clause is absolute, but 
this does not prevent the government from burdening the 
exercise of religion in certain circumstances. For example, the 
Free Exercise Clause would not shelter a religion that 
condoned human sacrifice.138 On the other hand, any law that 
prohibited an activity specifically because of its religious 
  
 134 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 135 See, e.g., Muehlhoff, supra note 109, at 219 (citation omitted).  
 136 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 137 Id. amend. I.  
 138 Claire Mullally, Free-Exercise Clause Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. 
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/free-exercise-clause. 
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nature would violate the Free Exercise Clause.139 Further, even 
a law that is facially neutral but whose purpose is to 
discriminate against a religion would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.140 Conflicts arise when religious beliefs conflict with a 
person’s duty as a citizen to comply with a neutral law. As the 
Supreme Court succinctly summarized the history of its free-
exercise decisions, “The government may not compel affirmation 
of religious belief, . . . punish the expression of religious 
doctrines it believes to be false, . . . impose special disabilities on 
the basis of religious views or religious status, . . . or lend its 
power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma . . . .”141 It took the Court more than one 
hundred years to arrive at this doctrine.  
B. History 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause seems to have come full circle since its early 
interpretations. The Court’s reading was initially very narrow, 
then broadened and liberalized in the mid-twentieth century, 
and then narrowed again by the Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.142 The first Supreme Court decision to 
interpret the Free Exercise Clause was Reynolds v. United 
States in 1878.143 The Court applied a “rational basis test” that 
became the standard to determine whether a law infringed the 
Free Exercise Clause.144 The test stated that the government 
could regulate religiously motivated practices as long as it had a 
rational basis to do so.145 Given that the government could easily 
satisfy this standard, the Court upheld generally applicable laws 
against Free Exercise Clause claims until the 1960s. 
In 1940, the Supreme Court decided Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, which made the Free Exercise Clause applicable 
to the states.146 This decision opened the door for the Supreme 
  
 139 Id. 
 140 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993). 
 141 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) 
(citations omitted). 
 142 See generally Mullally, supra note 138. 
 143 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, a Mormon 
polygamist was convicted under an anti-polygamy law. In response to the challenge to 
his conviction, the Supreme Court upheld the law and stated that the Free Exercise 
Clause protected beliefs, and not practices. Id. 
 144 Id. at 166. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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Court to hear challenges that came through state courts, giving 
the Court the opportunity to hear more cases and evolve its 
interpretation.147 The Warren and Berger Courts of the 1960s 
and 1970s began to take a broader view of the Free Exercise 
Clause. The “rational basis test” was replaced with a two-tier 
“compelling interest” test in Sherbert v. Verner, which required 
the government to show that it had a compelling state interest 
in enacting a law that imposed a substantial burden on a 
challenger’s religious beliefs.148 
This two-part test was upheld in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
which further held that a generally applicable law may 
nonetheless violate the Free Exercise Clause if it “unduly 
burdens the practice of religion.”149 There, the Court held that 
“only those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”150 Under this test, it is likely that a 
challenge to a face-veil ban would invalidate the law as unduly 
burdening the exercise of religion. 
Toward the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the 
Court began to take a more skeptical view of free-exercise 
claims, as evidenced by its decisions in 1985,151 1986,152 and 
1988.153 The change in the Supreme Court’s view of the Free 
  
 147 See generally Mullally, supra note 138. 
 148 The challenge was to the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman who was 
a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The plaintiff was fired from her job 
because she refused to work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs. Since South Carolina 
denied benefits to people who did not accept suitable employment, the state denied the 
plaintiff her unemployment benefits. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963). 
 149 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). The challenge in Yoder was 
made by an Amish family to a Wisconsin law that required children to attend school 
through the age of sixteen. Id. at 207. The family claimed that sending their child to 
school past the age of fourteen would violate their religious beliefs in that school after 
the age of fourteen would expose the child to influences that go against traditional 
Amish beliefs. Id. The court held that although the government had an interest in 
requiring education through age sixteen because this helped develop productive 
citizens who are self-reliant, this interest had to be examined in light of the 
circumstances of the case. Id. at 214. 
 150 Id. at 215. 
 151 Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (affirming the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision that prohibited Nebraska from enforcing a law that required picture 
identification on a driver’s license for a challenger who believed that having his picture on 
a driver’s license would violate his religious beliefs; the challenger believed that this 
would violate the second commandment’s warning against worshipping graven images). 
 152 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting a challenge to a 
military ban on headgear while on duty by an Orthodox Jewish army psychiatrist who 
wanted to wear a yarmulke while at work). 
 153 Lyng v. Nw. Protective Cemetery Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (adopting a 
per se rule that the government did not have to determine what impact its land use 
decisions might have on religious practices and allowing the construction of a road 
through a region that Native Americans considered sacred). 
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Exercise Clause was solidified in a seminal and controversial 
case, Employment Division v. Smith, in 1990.154 In the period 
between Sherbert and Smith, the Supreme Court continually 
applied the two-part balancing test set forth in Sherbert. The 
Court asked whether the government significantly burdened a 
religious practice and whether that burden could be justified by 
a compelling governmental interest. The decision in Smith, 
though it did not overturn previous free-exercise cases, was 
controversial because it held that heightened scrutiny no 
longer applied to the government’s refusal to grant religious 
exemptions to facially neutral laws that incidentally burden 
free exercise.155 The Court held that the government was not 
required to provide an exemption to a generally applicable 
criminal law that prohibited the use of peyote, and thus the 
state could legitimately deny unemployment benefits to 
someone who was fired for violating a valid criminal law.156  
In the wake of Smith, Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).157 The purpose of 
RFRA was to overrule the Court’s decision in Smith.158 RFRA 
requires that the government have a compelling interest and 
that its regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that interest whenever a person’s exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened.159 RFRA did not last long as applied to 
state governments, however. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the 
Court held that RFRA violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
and therefore was invalid insofar as it regulated the actions of 
state and local governments.160 On the other hand, RFRA was 
upheld as applied to the federal government in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal.161 Nevertheless, 
although the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to 
  
 154 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 155 Id. at 885. The controversy in Smith arose when two counselors at a 
private drug rehabilitation organization were fired because they had smoked peyote, a 
controlled substance, as part of a religious ceremony of the Native American Church. 
See generally id. Because their dismissal was predicated on “misconduct,” they were 
denied unemployment benefits by the state. See id. The case made its way to the 
Supreme Court where the denial of employment benefits was upheld. See id. 
 156 Id. at 885. 
 157 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
 158 Id. § 2000bb(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are . . . to restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)[,] and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)[,] and to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened . . . .”). 
 159 Id. § 2000bb-1. 
 160 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 161 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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state and local governments, some states have adopted similar 
provisions in their state statutes.162 This represents an 
important development in the context of face-veil bans in public 
schools since school boards act as arms of the state and are 
therefore limited by their state constitutions.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions following Smith 
demonstrate that laws that target religion will continue to be 
subject to strict scrutiny. The Court in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah held that Smith applied 
only to laws that are both facially neutral and generally 
applicable,163 explaining that:  
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by 
a compelling government interest even if the law has the incidental effect 
of burdening a particular religious practice . . . . A law failing to satisfy 
these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.164 
C. Sincerely Held Belief 
When facing a free exercise challenge, a natural inquiry 
is the sincerity of a challenger’s belief. The clear rule, however, 
is that judicial review should not evaluate whether the belief is 
theologically “correct.” Instead, the question is whether the 
individual sincerely holds the belief and considers the belief to 
be religious in nature. It is not for the courts to decide whether a 
belief is “correct” or not.165 In the Supreme Court’s words, “Men 
may believe what they cannot prove . . . . Religious experiences, 
which are as real as life to some, may be incomprehensible to 
others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals 
does not mean they can be made suspect before the law.”166  
State v. Hodges provides an example of how much 
deference courts are willing to give those who claim a religious 
exemption.167 Hodges was charged with multiple misdemeanors, 
and when he appeared in court to face these charges, he was 
  
 162 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—
A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 597 (1999) (citing 
RFRAs in Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas, 
among other states).  
 163 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
531 (1993). 
 164 Id. at 531-32 (citation omitted). 
 165 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).  
 166 Id. 
 167 State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985). 
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dressed as a chicken.168 The defendant stated that he was 
wearing such clothing for religious reasons,169 but the trial 
judge held Hodges in contempt of court.170 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the trial court erred in 
failing to inquire into the sincerity of Hodges’s beliefs.171 Thus, 
if the trial court had determined that Hodges genuinely and 
sincerely believed that his religion compelled him to come to 
court dressed in such a manner, the Free Exercise Clause 
would protect his ability to do so. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana may have limited this doctrine when it 
explained that “one can . . . imagine an asserted claim so 
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be 
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”172  
D. Conclusion on Free Exercise 
A generally applicable law that has an unintentional or 
accidental impact on religious practices will not be subject to 
strict scrutiny unless a state legislature has enacted a RFRA 
statute, a state legislature has inserted a religious exemption 
into the law, or a state court’s interpretation of the state free 
exercise clause gives exemptions to general laws. The 
consequence of less strict judicial scrutiny is that the law will 
likely be upheld as constitutional.  
  
 168 The trial judge described his outfit: He was  
dressed in a grossly shocking and bizarre attire, consisting of brown and 
white fur tied around his body at his ankles, loins and head, with a like vest 
made out of fur, and complete with eye goggles over his eyes. He had colored 
his face and chest with a very pale green paint or coloring. He had what 
appeared to be a human skull dangling from his waist and in his hand he 
carried a stuffed snake.  
Id. at 171 n.1. The Supreme Court of Tennessee describes further that  
the so-called vest consisted of two pieces of fur that covered each arm but did 
not meet in front or in back, leaving defendant’s chest and back naked to his 
waist. His legs were also naked from mid-way between his knee and waist to 
his ankles. He appeared to be carrying a military gas mask and other 
unidentifiable ornaments.  
Id. 
 169 Id. at 172 (stating, “This is a spiritual attire and . . . religious belief”). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 
(1981) (citing the Indiana Supreme Court). 
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IV. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE IN AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
A. Government Control over Public Schools 
The Supreme Court has explained that although 
students are not required to “shed their constitutional 
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”173 the First Amendment 
rights of students in public schools “are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”174 The 
Court has also “repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming 
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school 
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”175 
The relationship between religion and public schools is an 
important issue to many citizens, as the numerous challenges 
to school regulations during the twentieth century 
demonstrate. Parents and administrators have differed over 
many subjects, including reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, 
reading the Bible, praying in school, compulsory education, and 
teaching evolution.176 In light of Supreme Court decisions 
banning prayer and Bible reading in schools, one commentator 
has remarked that “God was kicked out of the public schools in 
the 1960s.”177 Essentially, Supreme Court jurisprudence holds 
that schools cannot help or oppose religion, nor protect or 
promote one religious theory or doctrine over another.178 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez179 and the fact that the 
  
 173 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-14 (1969). 
 174 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 175 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
 176 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (finding teaching 
creationism in public schools to be a violation of the Establishment Clause because it 
attempts to advance a particular religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-34 
(1972) (prohibiting schools from requiring education through age sixteen for Amish 
who believed children should not be in school past age fourteen); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 422-36 (1962) (holding that reciting a government-written prayer in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause even if the prayer was denominationally 
neutral); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting 
organized Bible reading in public schools because it was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(holding, on free speech grounds, that schools could offer the Pledge of Allegiance but 
could not require students to recite the Pledge). 
 177 JAMES W. FRASER, BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGION AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 2 (1999). 
 178 RICHARD C. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 198 (1984). 
 179  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Constitution fails to mention education specifically, the Tenth 
Amendment delegates the regulation of education to the 
states.180 Absent Congressional legislation on states’ authority 
in this area, state legislatures have plenary power, limited only 
by their state constitutions.181 School boards oversee the 
regulation of schools and are considered arms of the state, 
entrusted with carrying out the state legislature’s directives to 
educate children within the boards’ districts.182 
Before 1969, the Supreme Court generally deferred to 
school officials in their attempts to control students who 
engaged in disruptive expressive activity.183 The Supreme Court 
directly addressed student speech for the first time in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District.184 There, the 
Court invalidated an Iowa school-board policy that prohibited 
students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam 
War.185 The Court looked to balance the students’ rights against 
the administration’s need to maintain order and found that, 
because the prohibition was a direct violation of speech that did 
not “intrude[] upon the work of the school[] or the rights of the 
other students,” the students’ rights should prevail.186 Courts, 
however, have generally upheld content-neutral dress codes 
against facial challenges to the dress code as a whole.187  
B. Free Exercise Clashes with School Regulations 
Unlike certain European countries, such as France188 
and Germany, the United States generally does not prohibit 
wearing religious symbols in schools.189 So long as such religious 
symbols do not interrupt the educational environment, they 
will usually be permitted.190 Courts also tend to uphold school 
  
 180 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 181 CHARLES J. RUSSO, REUTTER’S THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 169 (7th ed. 
2009). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 935.  
 184 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 185 Id. at 514. 
 186 Id. at 508-09. 
 187 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 432-33 (9th Cir. 2008); 
see also Long v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cnty., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 (W.D. Ky. 2000).  
 188 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text. 
 190 Derek H. Davis, Reaction to France’s Ban: Headscarves and Other 
Religious Attire in American Public Schools, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 221, 222 (2004). 
2013] EXPLORING “BURQA BANS” 767 
administrative policies that bear a rational relationship to an 
educational purpose and are not vague or overbroad.191 Courts 
have therefore upheld dress codes in schools that restrict what 
students are allowed to wear.192 In one case, the court stated 
that “[p]ublic schools, . . . while responsible for inculcating the 
values of the First Amendment necessary for citizenship, are 
not themselves unbounded forums for practicing those 
freedoms.”193 Indeed, Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that 
the rights of students in schools are not coextensive with those 
of adults in society.194 
Given this qualified notion of students’ freedom within 
school grounds, courts have heard cases where the free exercise 
of religion was in direct conflict with school policies or 
regulations. In Illinois, the Illinois High School Association195 
prohibited a Jewish student from participating in after-school 
basketball because he violated a “no headwear” rule by wearing 
a yarmulke.196 The court compared the burden on the plaintiff 
in being denied the right to play because of his religion against 
the burden on the government in allowing him to play when he 
did not meet the vague requirements.197 The court held that the 
association’s decision did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because the burden placed on the plaintiff did not outweigh the 
interest of the government to promote safety since the plaintiff 
had the choice of participating in other interscholastic sports 
that did not ban headgear.198 In California, Sikh students 
challenged a district-wide ban on weapons, claiming that this 
prohibition forced them to violate a central tenet of their 
  
 191 RUSSO, supra note 181, at 956. 
 192 See, e.g., Jacobs, 526 F.3d 419 (finding that school dress code passed 
intermediate scrutiny and did not violate Free Exercise Clause); Littlefield v. Forney 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a uniform policy even though 
it may regulate expressive conduct); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 
(6th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 193 Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 194 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 195 The Illinois High School Association was considered to be an arm of the 
state. Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 196 Id. (“[The First Amendment] would not forbid a regulation secular in 
purpose (the purpose of the no-headwear rule is to promote safety); general in 
application; not motivated by antipathy to any religious group on which the regulation 
might bear heavily or by sympathy for a competing group (there is no suggestion of any 
such motivation here); and that does not actually prohibit a religious observance but 
merely makes it more costly by forcing the observant to give up some government benefit 
(here, participation in an interscholastic sport sponsored by an arm of the state).”). 
 197 Brooke E. Newborn, Public School Dress Codes and the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, 80 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 172, 178 (2009). 
 198 Menora, 683 F.2d at 1036-37. 
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religion.199 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, which held that the students should be allowed to 
carry ceremonial knives so long as the knives were dull and 
“sewn tightly to [their] sheath[s],” students wore them under 
their clothing, and school officials were allowed to inspect the 
children to enforce these requirements.200 Finally, in Texas, 
students challenged the school board’s regulation against gang 
symbols, which the school administrators interpreted to 
prohibit wearing rosary necklaces.201 The court held that the 
prohibition was not supported by sufficient evidence that the 
necklaces caused a disruption that would have justified a ban, 
and therefore the necklaces were protected as a form of 
religious expression.202  
The closest that courts have come to addressing face 
veils in public schools came in Menora, where the Seventh 
Circuit evaluated the validity of religious headgear in schools.203 
In the wake of Smith, however, courts seem to agree that a 
neutral, generally applicable law whose purpose is not to 
interfere with religious practices will be difficult to challenge. 
Accordingly, a neutral law that has an incidental impact on 
religious activity will not be subject to strict scrutiny, unless a 
state has enacted a RFRA-like law or the state legislature has 
permitted a religious exemption.  
V. THE REGULATION IN PRACTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW A 
BAN ON FACE COVERINGS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS WOULD BE 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
A. Proposed Dress Code Regulation 101 
The following hypothetical dress-code regulation will 
provide a model to help analyze the potential attacks challengers 
would bring in a constitutional challenge based on the Free 
Exercise Clause: 
Dress Code Regulation 101: Any type of garment that has the effect 
of covering, concealing, or otherwise masking the identity of the 
wearer shall be forbidden on school grounds during school hours. 
  
 199 Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 200 Id. at 886. 
 201 Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 202 Id. at 671. 
 203 See generally Menora, 683 F.2d 1030; see also supra note 133.  
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B. Implications of Dress Code Regulation 101 
Dress Code Regulation 101 clashes with the Muslim 
religious practice of wearing a face veil because a Muslim 
female could not comply both with Regulation 101 and her 
religious obligations. Thus, a Muslim female would claim that 
Regulation 101 violates the Free Exercise Clause since it 
interferes with her religious practice of wearing a face veil.  
Because school boards are considered arms of the state, 
their enactment of Dress Code Regulation 101 would constitute 
state action.204 Therefore, Smith provides the controlling 
precedent for these actions. Under Smith, a neutral, generally 
applicable law is subject to limited judicial scrutiny.205 
Moreover, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law 
does not have a rational relationship to a governmental 
interest. Additionally, free-exercise jurisprudence mandates 
that any law having an effect on religious practices must be 
generally applicable and must not directly prohibit a religious 
practice. Indeed, under Church of Lukumi, any direct ban on a 
religious practice would be a violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause and thus would be unconstitutional.206 Moreover, Church 
of Lukumi also stood for the proposition that any law whose 
purpose is to prohibit a religious practice—even if the law is 
facially neutral—will be held unconstitutional.207 Accordingly, 
any potential ban on face veils would need to ban all variations 
of face coverings; Regulation 101 is an example of such a policy. 
A court would also need to verify that the purpose behind 
Regulation 101’s enactment was not to specifically interrupt 
the Muslim female religious practice of wearing face veils but 
instead that that outcome was an incidental effect of a 
generally applicable law. 
Further, any challenge to Dress Code Regulation 101 
would unquestionably implicate the freedom of religion. An 
individual’s religious beliefs must be considered legitimate in a 
challenge to a law that places a burden on his or her exercise of 
  
 204 In some cases, school boards may promulgate dress codes pursuant to state 
legislative authorization. The Nevada legislature, for example, authorizes school 
boards of trustees to establish dress code uniforms. Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1165-66 (D. Nev. 2005) (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.458, the 
state legislative authorization to implement uniform requirements).  
 205 See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra notes 163-63 and accompanying text. 
 207 Id. 
770 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
religion.208 Although scholars have debated whether wearing a 
face veil is compelled by Islam, that issue is not relevant here.209 
Several courts have improperly questioned the obligatory 
nature of the face veil in ruling on whether compulsory removal 
was allowed. For example, in Freeman v. Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, the court—after hearing 
experts from both sides—determined that since Islam allowed 
for removal of the veil in certain cases, the challenger was not 
burdened by removing her face veil for a driver’s license 
photograph.210 Similarly, a judge in Minnesota dismissed a case 
because a woman refused to remove her niqab, reasoning that 
as far as he was concerned, the face veil was not a religious 
requirement.211 Both judges in these cases were mistaken when 
they questioned the legitimacy of the religious nature of the 
face veil. A challenger does not bear the burden of proving that 
the religious practice that is being impeded is, in fact, 
religious.212 The requirement that the belief be sincerely held 
would surely be met in the case of the face veil, given the 
history and ideological purpose of hijab.213 
C. Dress Code Regulation 101 and the Hybrid Rights Doctrine 
Under limited scrutiny, it is clear that Regulation 101 
would pass a constitutionality test.214 However, a threshold 
consideration in determining if something other than limited 
scrutiny would apply is whether wearing a face veil in public 
schools invokes a hybrid right. The hybrid rights doctrine is 
triggered where both the free exercise of religion and an 
independent constitutional right are implicated.215 In Smith, the 
Supreme Court refrained from overturning Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
which allowed for a religious exemption from complying with 
the law where Smith did not.216 Instead, the court distinguished 
the case by determining that the right in Yoder was a hybrid 
  
 208 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.  
 209 See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. 
 210 Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 57 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 211 Schwartzbaum, supra note 127, at 1534-35. 
 212 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 213 See supra Part I. 
 214 The plaintiff carries the burden under limited scrutiny to show that the 
regulation does not have a rational relationship to a government interest, which is a 
very high standard to meet.  
 215 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
 216 Id. 
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right.217 There, the compulsory-education law burdened 
plaintiff’s freedom of religion and the right of a parent to decide 
how his or her child should be educated.218 In Smith, the Court 
stated that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held the 
First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not 
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”219 In the case 
of Regulation 101, an argument could be made that wearing a 
face veil is protected by both the freedom of religion and the 
freedom of speech.  
A successful hybrid rights claim allows a plaintiff to 
challenge a neutral, generally applicable law if the free exercise 
of religion and an independent constitutional right are 
burdened by the governmental action. Essentially, when a 
hybrid rights claim is established, the government action is 
subject to heightened scrutiny.220 There are several factors that 
the court must consider, however, before applying the higher 
scrutiny required by the hybrid rights doctrine.  
First, the federal courts of appeals have not universally 
accepted the concept of hybrid rights. The Sixth Circuit 
characterized the doctrine as illogical,221 and the Eleventh 
Circuit recognized Justice Souter’s concurrence in Church of 
Lukumi in which he called the doctrine “untenable.”222 Courts 
that reject the hybrid rights claim do not exempt the 
application of the general rule established in Smith.223 Thus, in 
  
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 881. The right of a parent to control his or her child’s education was 
held to be a fundamental right in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
 219 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 220 A court in the Fifth Circuit held that wearing rosaries was a combination 
of free exercise of religion and free speech and therefore applied a heightened level of 
scrutiny because it was a hybrid claim. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 
F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 221 Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 
F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 222 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (“And the distinction Smith draws strikes me as 
ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional 
right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow 
the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified 
by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the 
peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an 
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another 
constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what 
Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.”).  
 223 Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180. 
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jurisdictions that do not accept the hybrid right doctrine, the 
level of review does not change. 
Second, in some jurisdictions that accept the doctrine, a 
hybrid rights claim may still fail if either the free-exercise claim 
or the independent constitutional claim does not stand on its 
own.224 Furthermore, courts have diverged with respect to the 
strength required in order to make each claim cognizable and 
establish a hybrid rights claim together.225 In certain jurisdictions, 
courts hold that the independent constitutional claim must be at 
least “colorable.”226 Other jurisdictions hold that there must be a 
viable claim of an independent constitutional right before the 
court will apply a higher level of scrutiny.227 Therefore, much 
depends on the jurisdiction where a claim is filed.  
Plaintiffs who invoke the hybrid rights doctrine and 
claim that a generally applicable law infringes on their free 
exercise of religion and right to free speech have been 
successful in several cases. For example, the court in Chalifoux 
v. New Caney Independent School District held that wearing 
rosaries implicated a combination of free exercise of religion 
and free speech, and therefore the court applied a heightened 
level of scrutiny since the plaintiff presented a hybrid claim.228 
If a court were to decide that Regulation 101 infringed on both 
freedom of religion and free speech, like in Chalifoux, a strict 
scrutiny test would apply and the government would have to 
prove that the regulation furthered a compelling interest.  
D. Regulation 101’s Burden on Free Exercise 
If a court applies the hybrid rights doctrine, it must 
weigh the burden on free exercise against the government’s 
interest. In other words, a heightened form of strict scrutiny 
would apply to Regulation 101. Undoubtedly, Regulation 101 
  
 224 See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
colorable claim means that there is a “fair probability” that there would be success on 
the merits of that claim, but not necessarily certainty); Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. 
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a “colorable” 
independent constitutional claim must be made for the court to apply higher scrutiny); 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (requiring the 
independent claim to be viable in and of itself in order for the higher level of scrutiny to 
apply for the hybrid claim). 
 225 See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, What Constitutes “Hybrid Rights” Claim 
Under Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 163 A.L.R. 
FED. 493 (2000). 
 226 Miller, 176 F.3d 1202; Swanson, 135 F.3d 694. 
 227 Brown, 68 F.3d 525.  
 228 Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
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would place a significant burden on the Muslim religious 
practice of wearing a face veil. The ban on face coverings would 
prohibit Muslim women from doing something they sincerely 
believe is required by their religion. The result of a ban on face 
coverings may put Muslim females in the position of choosing 
between adhering to Regulation 101—which would compromise 
their religious beliefs—and refusing to attend school or seeking 
alternative education. Although education has not been 
considered a fundamental right and the Constitution fails to 
mention it, educating the citizenry is considered an important 
charge of the government. The Supreme Court has said that 
education plays a “fundamental” and “pivotal role” in maintaining 
a productive society,229 and that the “American people have always 
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of 
supreme importance . . . .”230 Thus, forcing a student to choose 
between a religious belief and an important right would place a 
substantial burden on the individual. 
E. The Government’s Compelling Interest in Enacting 
Regulation 101 
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the next inquiry is what 
compelling school board interests the burden on free exercise 
would be measured against. In challenges to dress codes, courts 
have recognized a variety of compelling governmental 
interests. One district court held that the government had 
compelling interests in “bridging socioeconomic gaps between 
families in the school district,” advancing learning rather than 
allowing students to focus on how peers were dressed, and 
helping improve security.231 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held 
that maintaining an orderly and safe learning environment, 
increasing the focus on instruction, promoting safety and life-
long learning, and encouraging professional and responsible 
dress for all students qualified as compelling governmental 
interests.232 In another case, the Fifth Circuit summarized the 
general opinion that “[t]he touchstone for sustaining such 
regulations is the demonstration that they are necessary to 
alleviate interference with the educational process.”233  
  
 229 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982). 
 230 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
 231 Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (E.D. Ark. 2007). 
 232 Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 510 
(5th Cir. 2009).  
 233 Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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The strongest arguments in defense of Regulation 101 
align with the justifications offered by the countries that have 
enacted face veil bans. First, security must always be a major 
reason for regulation in schools. Chief among school boards’ 
objectives is to ensure a safe and secure environment where 
education is the primary focus. Thus, if school boards have 
legitimate concerns that face veils could interfere with school 
officials’ ability to maintain order, then a ban would serve as a 
compelling reason in favor of Regulation 101.  
The access to equal opportunities for women is 
essential, and it begins in schools. The importance of education 
need not be elucidated in light of its fundamental nature in 
American society. Indeed, the Ordinance of 1787 provides, 
“Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the 
means of education shall forever be encouraged.”234 Moreover, the 
importance of women’s struggle for equality cannot be 
respectfully condensed for the limited purposes here. It is 
sufficient to note that both the ability to obtain a public 
education and to actively participate and interact in an 
educational setting are essential for building and maintaining 
rights to equal treatment for women. The counterargument to 
this point, of course, is that allowing face veils will educate other 
students about diversity and cultural awareness. Openness to 
diversity, however, can be encouraged and experienced in a 
number of ways, and banning face veils in public schools would 
not block those alternative opportunities for cultural education.  
In the context of public schools, the government can 
make further arguments in favor of Regulation 101. In a school 
environment, the process of teaching and learning requires 
interaction between teachers and students as well as between 
students and their peers. A compelling argument could be 
made that a face covering would impede the kinds of 
interaction that are essential to a productive classroom 
environment. Indeed, a spokesperson for the Department for 
Education and Skills in Britain noted that “[s]ome teachers say 
it is difficult to read a child’s expression or understand what is 
being said [when his or her face is covered by a veil].”235 
Canada’s requirement that women must remove their face veils 
when taking their citizenship oath was enacted to ensure that 
  
 234 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (quoting Ordinance of 1787) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 235 English Schools Ban, supra note 6. 
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“judges, and everyone present [can] ensure that all citizenship 
candidates are, in fact, taking the oath as required by law.”236 
Similarly, teachers in classrooms have an interest in ensuring 
participation from students. This is exactly the interaction that 
is necessary and that Regulation 101 would guarantee.  
School administrations often include a “no hat” rule in 
their dress codes because hats can be distracting, impede other 
students from properly viewing the board, and facilitate hiding 
contraband in certain circumstances. Many of the same 
arguments could be made regarding a face covering. Similar to 
hats, face veils may provide a source of distraction, block other 
students from seeing the board, and enable students to conceal 
dangerous items.  
In conclusion, whether the judicial scrutiny is minimal 
or strict, there is a strong likelihood that a constitutional 
challenge to Regulation 101 would fail. In the case of minimal 
scrutiny, a rational relationship exists between the regulation 
and a governmental interest, and therefore it is very likely that 
the regulation would be upheld. In the case of strict scrutiny, 
although the ban imposes a substantial burden on the free 
exercise of religion, it is also supported by strong governmental 
interests. Accordingly, a court is likely to find that the 
government’s interests outweigh the burdens on free exercise.  
CONCLUSION 
Similar to the United States Constitution, Article 9 of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
contains a conditional freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion provision.237 In 2005, the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld a university ban on Islamic headscarves in 
Turkey, stating that secularist and equality principles allowed 
the ban of religious symbols in schools and universities.238 
Subsequently, France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
  
 236 Niqabs, Burkas Must be Removed, supra note 7. 
 237 Eur. Ct. H.R., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (June 2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf (The 
protection of freedom of thought, conscience of religion is “subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
 238 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956.  
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Spain, Italy, and other non-European countries have all 
implemented or considered full or partial bans on face veils. 
Though the issue has not yet been through its paces in the 
United States, imagining a hypothetical dress-code regulation 
banning face coverings in public schools shows that no 
constitutional barriers would stand in the way of its 
implementation, even if the incidental effect were to prohibit 
Muslim females from wearing a veil to school. A neutral, 
generally applicable law such as Dress Code Regulation 101 
might even be analyzed under minimal scrutiny. The result 
may seem troubling for some or logical for others, but the effect 
that this type of regulation would have on Muslim women who 
wear face veils—and the implications it carries for religious 
practices outside of schools—merit solemn reflection.  
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